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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43509 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2013-2590 
v.     ) 
     ) 
ROLANDO FUENTES,  ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Rolando Fuentes, pled guilty to one count of 
grand theft by possession.  He received a unified sentence of eight years, with three 
years fixed.  Although he was initially placed on probation, his probation was eventually 
revoked, and the district court retained jurisdiction.  After the district court relinquished 
jurisdiction, Mr. Fuentes filed an I.C.R 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion which the district 
court denied, finding Mr. Fuentes had waived his right to file a Rule 35 motion in the 
plea agreement.  On appeal, Mr. Fuentes contends that the district court erred in finding 
that Mr. Fuentes had waived his right to file a Rule 35 motion pursuant to the terms of 
the plea agreement.  
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On February 1, 2013, a person reported that their car had been broken into and 
several items removed, including a purse containing credit cards.  (Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.8.)  Law enforcement reviewed surveillance 
videos at two locations where the credit cards were used to purchase goods, and 
identified the vehicle used by the suspects as belonging to Rolando Fuentes.  (PSI, 
pp.8-9.)  Mr. Fuentes’ vehicle was stopped, he was detained and found in possession of 
several of the items reported as stolen.  (PSI, p.9.)     
Based on these facts, Mr. Fuentes was charged by Information with one count of 
burglary and one count of grand theft.1  (R., pp.18-19.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
binding on all parties and the district court pursuant to I.C.R. 11(f)(3), Mr. Fuentes pled 
guilty to an amended information alleging grand theft by possession and the remaining 
felony and misdemeanor charges were dismissed.  (R., pp.38-49.)  In exchange, the 
State agreed to recommend a suspended sentence of eight years, with three years 
fixed, and five years of probation.  (R., pp.39-40.)   
Mr. Fuentes was sentenced to eight years, with three years fixed, but the district 
court suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Fuentes on probation for five years and 
five months.2  (R., pp.65-68.)  Mr. Fuentes was ordered to serve 300 days in jail with 
                                            
1 Mr. Fuentes was also cited for petit theft and having an invalid driver’s license, in 
Canyon County case number 2013-2508 and with possession of drug paraphernalia 
and possession of burglary tools in Canyon County case number 2013-2512.  
(R., pp.22-23.) 
2 At the time he was sentenced, Mr. Fuentes was finishing up a six month sentence for 
misdemeanor DUI in Canyon County case number 2012-31087.  (R., pp.55-56; PSI, 
p.13.)  The district court added an additional five months to the probationary period to 
cover the remainder of the time he had to serve on the DUI sentence.  (R., pp.66.)   
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credit for 158 days already served, to be served concurrently with his sentence in 
Canyon County case number 2012-31087.  (R., p.67.) 
A few months later, a motion for probation violation was filed against Mr. Fuentes 
which alleged that Mr. Fuentes had changed his residence without his probation 
officer’s permission and had not reported to his probation officer for over two weeks.  
(R., pp.78-79.)  After Mr. Fuentes admitted that he violated some of the terms and 
condition of his probation, the district court revoked Mr. Fuentes’ probation, but retained 
jurisdiction for 365 days.  (R., pp.88-89, 98-100.)  Thereafter, the district court 
relinquished jurisdiction without a hearing.  (R., pp.101-102.) 
Mr. Fuentes then filed a timely Rule 35 motion asking the district court to 
reconsider its order relinquishing jurisdiction.  (R., pp.103-104.)  On June 2, 2015, the 
district court held a hearing on Mr. Fuentes’ motion.  (R., pp.108-110.)  The next day, 
the State filed a response to Mr. Fuentes’ motion in which it brought to the district 
court’s attention for the first time that Mr. Fuentes had waived his right to file a Rule 35 
motion as a term of the plea agreement.  (R., pp.111-117.)  On July 17, 2015, the 
district court denied Mr. Fuentes’s Rule 35 motion, finding Mr. Fuentes had waived his 
right to file a Rule 35 motion pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement.  (R., pp.118-
123.)  On August 25, 2015, Mr. Fuentes timely appealed the district court’s order 
denying his Rule 35 motion.  (R., pp.124-128.) 
 
ISSUES 
Did the district court err in finding Mr. Fuentes waived his right to file a Rule 35 motion 
from the order relinquishing jurisdiction? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Finding Mr. Fuentes Waived His Right To File A Rule 35 
Motion From The Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
 
Mr. Fuentes’ plea agreement contained, inter alia, the following terms: 
Defendant understands that pursuant to Idaho law he has an absolute 
right to appeal the judgment and sentence of the court as well as the right 
to move the Court to reconsider his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 and a right to file a petition for post-conviction relief.  
Notwithstanding these rights, if the Court accepts this plea agreement 
then Defendant willingly waives his right to appeal the judgment and 
sentence and the right to move the Court to reconsider and reduce his 
sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35.  
 
(Emphasis added.)  The district court denied Mr. Fuentes’ Rule 35 motion, finding 
Mr. Fuentes had waived his right to file a Rule 35 motion pursuant to the terms of the 
plea agreement.  (R., pp.118-123.)  The district court found that the term of the plea 
agreement regarding Mr. Fuentes’ waiver of the right to move the district court to 
reconsider and reduce his sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 was “a clear and 
unambiguous term of contract and is enforceable under Idaho law.”  (R., p.121.)  
However, an order relinquishing jurisdiction is not a “sentence” such that the term 
clearly and unambiguously foreclosed the filing of a Rule 35 motion from such an order.   
 While a plea agreement is contractual in nature, it must be measured by contract 
law standards.  State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885 (2013).  Appellate courts exercise 
free review over contract law standards.  Id.  A defendant may waive his right to appeal 
as part of a plea agreement.  Straub, 153 Idaho at 885.  “The prosecuting attorney and 
the attorney for the defendant . . . may engage in discussions with a view toward 
reaching an agreement, which may include a waiver to the defendant’s right to appeal 
the judgment and sentence of the court . . . .” I.C. R. 11(f)(1). 
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 A trial court has authority, under the rule governing motions to correct or reduce 
sentence, to reconsider its decision to relinquish jurisdiction  State v. Goodlett, 139 
Idaho 262, 265 (Ct. App. 2003).  Within 120 days after a court relinquishes retained 
jurisdiction, a motion for reconsideration of the sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 may be 
filed.  Id. (in which defendant’s Rule 35 motion specifically asked the court to reconsider 
the relinquishment and to place defendant on probation or to reinstate her to retained 
jurisdiction program); I.C.R. 35.  “Rule 35 confers upon the trial court authority to 
reconsider an order relinquishing jurisdiction and, if the court finds it appropriate, to 
place the defendant on probation notwithstanding having initially ordered a sentence of 
imprisonment into execution.”  Goodlett, 139 Idaho at 265. 
   
A. The Language Of The Plea Agreement Is Clear And Unambiguous 
The terms of the plea agreement entered into by the parties were clear and 
unambiguous.  The terms provided that Mr. Fuentes waived his right to file a Rule 35 
motion asking the court to reconsider and reduce his sentence.  However, the order 
relinquishing jurisdiction was not a sentence such that Mr. Fuentes, in agreeing to the 
terms of the plea agreement, agreed to waive his right to file a Rule 35 motion from that 
order. 
In determining whether a contract is ambiguous, the appellate court exercises 
free review, and its task is to ascertain whether the contract is reasonably subject to 
conflicting interpretation.  State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 257 (2012).  “If the language 
of the document is unambiguous, given its ordinary and well-understood meaning, we 
will not look beyond the four corners of the agreement to determine the intent of the 
parties.”  Id. 
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While the plea agreement required Mr. Fuentes to waive his “right to move the 
Court to reconsider and reduce his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35,” the 
relinquishment of jurisdiction is not a “sentence” and thus that term of the plea 
agreement is inapplicable and does not prohibit a Rule 35 motion for reconsideration.  
See State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 142-43 (2001) (holding that constitutional 
protections required at sentencing are inapplicable to a retained jurisdiction because 
sentencing occurs before the period of retained jurisdiction, not when jurisdiction is 
relinquished); State v. Ditmars, 98 Idaho 472 (1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1088 (1978) 
(holding that a sentence is “imposed” when it is initially pronounced rather than when 
the court later relinquishes jurisdiction); State v. Omey, 112 Idaho 930, 932 (Ct. App. 
1987) (holding a sentence is “imposed” when it is initially pronounced, even though 
jurisdiction is retained); but c.f. State v. Steelsmith, 153 Idaho 577, 581 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(holding that when jurisdiction is retained, the sentence is executed upon the transfer of 
the defendant to the Board of Correction, subject to possible subsequent suspension of 
the balance of the sentence).   
Here, Mr. Fuentes did not file a Rule 35 motion from the initial Judgment, he filed 
a Rule 35 motion from the order relinquishing jurisdiction, which was a request for the 
court to reconsider putting him on probation.  The language of the term of the plea 
agreement provided that Mr. Fuentes waived his “right to move the Court to reconsider 
and reduce his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35,” however, Mr. Fuentes did 
not ask the district court to “reconsider and reduce” his sentence.  He asked the district 
court to reconsider its decision to relinquish jurisdiction and instead place him on 
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probation or send him to complete another rider program—he never asked the district 
court to reduce his sentence.  (See PSI, pp.1-5; see generally 6/2/15 Tr.)   
Further, at the time Mr. Fuentes agreed to the terms of the plea agreement, he 
could not have foreseen that he would violate his probation, have it revoked but 
jurisdiction retained, then would be relinquished and would thusly be prohibited from 
asking the district court to reconsider its decision to relinquish jurisdiction.  Had the 
parties wished to limit Mr. Fuentes’ right to file a Rule 35 motion from the order 
relinquishing jurisdiction, they could have done so by specifically providing such a term 
in the plea agreement.  The general waiver of the right to file a Rule 35 motion from the 
sentence, by its plain language, does not include this circumstance.  Thus, the district 
court erred in concluding that Mr. Fuentes waived his right to file a Rule 35 motion 
asking the court to reconsider its order relinquishing jurisdiction as the prohibition of 
such a motion was not the mutual intent of the parties when the plea was entered. 
   
B. Alternatively, Should This Court Find The Terms Of The Plea Agreement Were 
Ambiguous, The Ambiguity Should Be Resolved In Favor Of Mr. Fuentes 
 Should this Court find the meaning of “right to move the Court to reconsider and 
reduce his sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35,” as used in the plea 
agreement, is ambiguous, the Court must still find Mr. Fuentes did not waive his right to 
file a Rule 35 motion from the order relinquishing jurisdiction.  
“Ambiguities in a plea agreement are to be interpreted in favor of the defendant.”  
State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 596 (2010).  “[A]mbiguities are construed in favor of 
the defendant.  Focusing on the defendant’s reasonable understanding also reflects the 
proper constitutional focus on what induced the defendant to plead guilty.”  Id (quoting 
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United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333, 1338 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993)) (emphasis in 
original). 
Should this court find the terms of the plea agreement regarding the Rule 35 
waiver were ambiguous, this court must still interpret the plea agreement in favor of 
Mr. Fuentes.  Thus, the district court erred in concluding that Mr. Fuentes waived his 
right to file a Rule 35 motion asking the court to reconsider its order relinquishing 
jurisdiction. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Fuentes respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order denying his 
Rule 35 motion and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 1st day of February, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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